In a model with internal and external risks together with incentive problems, this paper investigates the role of a risky environment on contractual incompleteness. We consider a typical employment contract with an extra control option. This option is contractable ex ante, exercisable ex post, and good for incentives. But, the employer may choose not to have it in a contract. We identify some interesting circumstances under which the option is not in the optimal contract. Our main findings are that (1) external risks determine contractual incompleteness, and (2) a complete contract can better handle incentives, while an incomplete contract can better handle external risks. Hence, our analysis of incomplete contracts is somewhat consistent with Williamson's (1985) idea of low-powered incentives inside the firm and high-powered incentives outside the firm.
Introduction
Over the last two decades, contractual incompleteness proposed by Grossman and Hart (1986) , Hart (1988 Hart ( , 1995 and Hart and Moore (1990) has formed the basis for organization theory, which is now playing a central role in studies of the boundaries of the firm, corporate governance, and law and regulation. With incomplete contracts, many control mechanisms become relevant within the firm. In particular, when contractual incompleteness is coupled with asset specificity, a potential hold-up problem ensues, which leads to the question of optimal allocations of income and control rights in business relationships.
Contracts in reality are always incomplete and they differ only in degrees of incompleteness. Understanding this phenomenon in theory turns out to be challenging. Tirole (1999) states that "in the literature, incomplete contract models are usually preceded by an invocation of transaction costs." Maskin (2002) points out that the transaction cost literature on incomplete contracts is based on three arguments: (1) some events are not common knowledge or commonly observable, i.e., they are not verifiable; (2) some events are unforeseen or indescribable ex ante; 1 and (3) some aspects are too costly to write them into a contract. Such studies include Aghion and Bolton (1992) , Tirole (1999) , Maskin and Tirole (1999a, 1999b) , and Maskin (2002) . In particular, Dye (1985) argues for writing costs, Hart and Moore (1988) emphasizes renegotiation, Hart (1995) contends for unforeseen contingencies, and Segal (1999) cites complexity.
Our model is based purely on rationality. We show that, even though there is no transaction cost for a more sophisticated contract, an incomplete contract can be the choice by rational economic agents. Aghion and Bolton (1992) "model contractual incompleteness by assuming that some important future variables have to be left out of the contract if they are difficult or impossible to describe initially" -a transaction-cost argument; in contrast, we model contractual incompleteness by assuming that some important future variables have to be left out of the contract due to external uncertainty -a rationality argument. Specifically, we argue that external risks (risks outside the existing relationships) are a key to contractual incompleteness. Due to a uncertain environment, to avoid being constrained by a complete contract, the principal may choose to leave some items out. Although this has a negative effect on incentives, the principal may, on bal-1 Unawareness should be included in this category. However, the existing literature rarely discusses this aspect. For example, Maskin's (2002) Theorem clearly does not have unawareness in mind. Also, Wang and Zhou (2004) , Wang (2009) and Qiu and Wang (2009) present a different argument: a contract is incomplete since there are multiple mechanisms at work. With the assistance of other mechanisms, an optimal contract can be as simple as a linear sharing rule.
ance, prefer an incomplete contract under some circumstances, especially when external uncertainty is large.
In a model with internal and external risks together with incentive problems, this paper investigates the role of a risky environment on the incompleteness of contracts. We consider a typical relationship between a principal and an agent. There is uncertainty in the output of the project. We call this risk internal risk, since such risk is what the players have to face within their existing relationship. This risk is defined by an output distribution function conditional on the two parties' inputs. In the standard agency model, the optimal contract balances between incentive inducing and risk sharing. The risk sharing is about the sharing of internal risks. However, the principal may keep her options open by considering alternative relationships besides her relationship with the inside agent. This introduces additional risks into the existing relationship. We call this risk external risk, since the players within a relationship do not need to face such risk if they do not consider the option of introducing outsiders into their relationship. We wonder what effect external risks may have on contractual incompleteness.
For the purpose, we reconsider the standard principal-agent model with a partially verifiable output and unverifiable inputs (called efforts). We allow the principal to have an additional control option, which is contractable ex ante and exercisable ex post. The principal may choose to write the option into a contract or leave it out. If the option is in the contract, we say that the contract is complete; if the option is not in the contract, the contract is incomplete. Will the principal ever prefer an incomplete contract to a complete contract? What are the circumstances under which the principal prefers an incomplete contract? In general, when will the principal deliberately leave some contractable items out of a contract even if they are costless to use and helpful for controlling incentives?
We find that, when the incentive problem does not exist, the external risk is the dominant factor and thus the incomplete contract is better (Proposition 3). When there is no external risk, the incentive problem is the dominant factor and thus the complete contract is better (Proposition 4). When both the external risk and incentive problem exist, the principal has to balance the two factors in her choice of the type of contract. It turns out that a risky labor market for the principal, an able outside agent and the unequal importance of investments from the two parties (defined in Proposition 6(d)) will tip the balance towards an incomplete contract (Proposition 6).
One example of our model is a tenure-track contract in academia. It would seem feasible to offer more complete tenure-track contracts with clearly specified and verifiable conditions for tenure. Yet, tenure-track contracts are universally incomplete. The degree of incompleteness differs among universities and it is typically less complete for top-tier universities. What are the factors that determine the degree of incompleteness? Our analysis suggests that a junior member's expected quality, the observed performance, market conditions, complementarity of skills and various risks involved are important factors. Hence, it may be optimal for a top-tier university to offer a highly incomplete tenure-track contract. Kaplan and Strömberg (2003) show evidence in support of our theory. They find strong evidence that more control is provided to investors if uncertainty is larger. They also find clear evidence that contract terms are sometimes renegotiated. In about 30% of subsequent financing rounds, some contractual rights from a previous financing round are renegotiated as part of the new contract. This gives support for our incomplete contract, since our incomplete contract is the same as a renegotiable complete contract. If a contract is to be renegotiated later, it may not always be advantageous to put in too many terms in the initial contract (our key point). Kaplan and Strömberg also investigate the impact of external risks on contractual terms. They find clear evidence indicating the allocation of more control to investors when uncertainty of investment is high. As uncertainty increases, investors demand more control. "The results imply that for ventures with greater initial uncertainty about viability, the VC (venture capitalist) receives more board and voting control, and demands stronger performance (through the automatic conversion price) before ceding control. This is broadly consistent with Aghion and Bolton (1992) ." "An alternative interpretation is that because of the large uncertainty and difficulty in writing all contingencies, control is given to the VC."
Our results are also related to the literature on internal labor markets in labor economics. In an attempt to reduce labor turnover, firms may develop their own internal labor markets. As pointed out by Osterman (1987) , two factors are important for the emergence of internal labor markets: firm-specific human capital and uncertainty in external labor markets. In internal labor markets, firms often provide job security and job training in firm-specific skills. Osterman argues that the computer industry develops its internal labor market after the external labor demand has expanded greatly. This observation is consistent with our conclusion that an increasing wage in the external job market will induce the firm to offer job security. Baker and Holmstrom (1995) find that wage growth and promotions are not closely related. Instead, they find that ability is the common driver that drives both wage growth and promotions. They find strong evidence in support of the existence of internal labor markets, but they find that external labor markets have limited influence on internal labor markets. Gibbons and Waldman (1999) construct a selection model based on ability. Their model explains a few key empirical findings, such as a positive serial correlation in wage growth and a positive correlation between wage growth and promotions. The worker's ability is also a crucial factor in our model. Finally, Lazear and Oyer (2004) find empirical evidence indicating an important impact of external labor markets on internal labor markets. This paper proceeds as follows. In Section 2, we set up the model. In Section 3, we derive two types of optimal contracts from our model. In Section 4, we study various circumstances under which the incomplete contract may be inferior or superior to the complete contract. In Section 5, we conclude with some remarks. All the proofs and derivations are in the Appendix.
The Model The Project
Consider an agency model in which a principal hires an agent (the inside agent) to undertake a project. The project lasts two periods and yields a random output x at the end (date 2). At the beginning of the project, each party invests an effort, a from the inside agent and b from the principal, with private costs ( ) c a and ( ) C b , respectively. Denote A and B as the effort spaces for a and b, respectively. The two efforts generate a joint investment ( ) h a b , . The agent's ability is represented by an index [0 ) θ ∈ Θ ≡ , ∞ . The timing of the events is shown in Figure 1 .
Ability θ is unknown to both parties at date 0 (ex ante); it becomes known to both parties at date 1 (ex post). We assume that the disinformation about θ is symmetric, meaning that the two parties have a common distribution function ( ) θ Φ about θ ex ante, with density function ( ) φ θ . In the real world, a person may or may not know his own ability better than a company. For example, when we were looking for jobs at universities after graduation, we generally did not know the extent of our own publishing abilities. On the other hand, the departments to which we applied had seen and hired many candidates like us before. 
= =
In our model, the principal will always include an output sharing rule in a contract, if possible, and, in addition, she may include the outside option in the contract. If the principal explicitly includes the outside option in the contract, the contract is complete; otherwise, the contract is incomplete. Here, the difference between the two contracts is that one is more complete than the other.
Timing
As shown in Figure 1 : At 0 t = , the principal offers a sharing rule 1 ( ) s x to the inside agent, based on verifiable output 1 x . At the same time, depending on the type of the contract, the principal may offer a conditional job guarantee in the contract. If the contract is accepted, the two parties simultaneously invest a and b and incur costs ( ) c a and ( ) C b , respectively. At 1 t = , the uncertainty about θ is resolved. The principal considers the outside option to replace the agent with an outside agent, who has ability 0 θ for a fixed salary 0 s . A decision to hire a replacement will be based on the type of the contract as well as on the relative quality and cost of the outside agent. At 2 t = , the project is finished and payments are made based on the existing output-sharing rule, which is either 1 ( ) s x or 0 . s
Notation and Assumptions
We assume that both the agent and the principal are risk neutral in income. However, both parties have convex cost in effort. Hence, the agent's utility function, as a function of income and effort, is concave. The focus in such a model is on effort. With cost convexity in effort, risk matters. As pointed out by Maskin and Tirole (1999) , one of the three key assumptions in the incomplete-contract literature is the risk-neutrality assumption. We follow the standard assumptions. Denote the ex post expected revenues of output i x as 2 0ˆ(
and the ex ante expected revenue without the option as
∫
Standard assumptions are imposed on the functions:
Two Types of Contracts

Incomplete Contract
Incomplete contracts are those that do not utilize all the contractable variables at disposal. In this subsection, we assume that the principal decides to offer an incomplete contract, in which an output-sharing rule is provided but there is no mention of continuous hiring. Ex post, since the outside option has not been contracted away, the principal has the default control rights over it. The ex post expected welfare gain from exercising the outside option is
where 0 s is the cost of hiring the outside agent. Note that the costs of efforts have already been sunk at this point of time. Note also that, in an incomplete contract, θ need not be verifiable. Given an arbitrary random variable θ, define
After the contract is signed, the two parties play a Nash game to determine efforts a and b. The two first-order conditions are
Then, the principal's second-best problem is
where u is the agent's reservation utility. When both efforts are contractable, the principal's first-best problem is
. . , , ≥ + .
Lemma 1 (First-Best Incomplete Contract). With incomplete contracts, the firstbest efforts ( , )
i i a b * * * * are determined by
and the first best can be achieved by a fixed contract. Here, the optimality of a linear contract is due to risk neutrality and the failure of achieving the first best is due to double moral hazard.
Proposition 1 (Second-Best Incomplete Contract). With incomplete contracts, the second-best efforts ( )
It is natural that the expected output increases when the agent increases his investment. Hence, condition " 1
θ is strictly increasing in a " actually represents a minimum degree of output verifiability. If output is completely unverifiable, output sharing is completely impossible and the incomplete contract is always superior to the complete contract (Proposition 5).
Remark 1. One advantage of a linear contract is that the validity of the first-order approach (FOA), i.e., (
, , can be easily guaranteed by simple concavity conditions on the revenue function; see, for example, Wang and Zhu (2005) . We will thus ignore the issue of the validity of the FOA in this paper.
Remark 2. We have implicitly assumed that the inside agent's human capital is firm-specific. That is, the agent's best job opportunity ex post is with the existing firm. Due to this, an ex post individual rationality (IR) condition is not considered in our model. This is a standard treatment in a two-period agency model. However, the ex ante IR condition is indeed included in our model.
Remark 3. We have also implicitly assumed that an outside agent is not available ex ante. For this, we may think of the inside agent as the best choice for the principal from the ex-ante labor market.
Complete Contract
In this subsection, we assume that the principal decides to offer a complete contract with a conditional job guarantee. In a complete contract, θ needs to be verifiable. By this, the principal can state explicitly in the contract that when the agent's ability is above a certain level, his job at the company is guaranteed. In this sense, we say that the option is contractable. Specifically, suppose now that the principal commits ex ante to replace the inside agent when her ability is lower than a certain level , c θ where the subscript c standards for complete contract. That is, c θ is the threshold below which the principal is to replace the inside agent. Since c θ is verifiable, this minimum quality standard can be written into a contract and is enforceable by law. Then, the ex ante expected gain and expected revenue are
where E is the expectation operator on 0 s . The inside agent's ex ante utility function is
and the principal's ex ante utility function is
Then, the principal's second-best problem is 
When both efforts are contractible, the principal's first-best problem is
Notice that, in a complete contract, the principal chooses a threshold c θ , while there is no such choice in an incomplete contract. More choices may help increase profit; but, the additional choice has changed the profit function. are determined by Remark 4. The incomplete contract is renegotiation-proof. For the complete contract, if the outside option is renegotiable ex post, the optimal renegotiable complete contract is the same as the optimal incomplete contract. We will therefore have no need to discuss renegotiable contracts as a separate class of contracts.
Optimality of Incomplete Contract
In this section, we compare the two contracts and find conditions under which one is superior to the other.
The Main Conclusions
The firm faces both internal and external risks. On the one hand, within its relationship with the inside agent, the firm faces uncertainty on its output. This uncertainty is described by the density functions [ , , ( , ) ],
which is affected by the relationship-specific variables ( , , ).
a b θ
We call this uncertainty the internal risk. On the other hand, the firm also faces uncertainty from the labor market when considering an outside agent to replace its inside agent. We call this uncertainty the external risk. Hence, the firm in our model faces three problems: the incentive problem, the internal risk and the external risk. Since the principal and the inside agent are both risk neutral in income, the internal risk is not an issue in our model. Therefore, the principal actually faces two problems: the incentive problem and the external risk. Here, we see an advantage of risk neutrality in income in our model setting: it allows us to focus on the issue of incentives vs external risk.
The incentives are the investment levels chosen by the two parties ex ante, and the external risk is the possibility of encountering a bad labor market ex post. An incomplete contract allows the principal to make a decision when the ex post labor market condition becomes clear, but it has a negative effect on incentives. A complete contract is good for incentives, but it imposes the risk of a bad ex post labor market on the principal. In other words, incomplete contracts are good for handling external risks and complete contracts are good for handling incentives. Note that the inside agent is assumed to have firm-specific human capital so there is no risk of her leaving when the labor market is good.
Proposition 3 (First Best). The first-best incomplete contract is always better than the first-best complete contract.
Under the first best, there are no incentive problems. The external risk is the dominant factor. Hence, the incomplete contract is better since it can better handle external risks. For a certain labor market, incentives are the only factor in the model. Hence, the complete contract is better since it can better handle incentives.
Proposition 4 (Second Best without External Risks
Proposition 5. If output is completely unverifiable, the second-best incomplete contract is always better than the second-best complete contract.
With early commitment of job security, the complete contract depends almost totally on an output-sharing rule to induce incentives, while the incomplete contract relies on both an output-sharing rule and the outside option to induce incentives. When an output-sharing rule is not available, the only possible payment rule is a fixed payment .
s This fixed payment has no effect on incentives. Hence, the incomplete contract is better.
For the general case when both the incentive problem and external risk exist, due to complexity, we choose some specific functions in order to analyze various situations. Specific functions allow us to make detailed analysis and obtain some clear-cut conclusions.
Proposition 6 (Second Best with External Risks). Assume 
where That is, if the labor market is risky, i.e., 0 s is unknown ex ante, then the second-best incomplete contract can dominate the second-best complete contract under certain conditions, but not always. Generally speaking, the incomplete contract is superior when (1) the labor market is likely to be an employers' market (cheap labor), or (2) the inside agent is likely to be of low ability, or (3) a highly capable outside agent is available, or (4) the importance of the two parties' investments is quite unequal. (5) If the incentive problem is severe, as measured by a large 1 , μ the complete contract tends to be better. Results (1)-(3) in Proposition 6 are quite intuitive. Result (4) needs an explanation. As we know, with double risk neutrality (both parties are risk neutral, as in this paper), a single moral hazard problem can be completely resolved by a simple/linear contract. However, a double moral hazard problem can never be completely resolved by an output-sharing contract (Wang and Zhu, 2005) . Hence, under double risk neutrality, double moral hazard is a serious incentive problem while single moral hazard is not. Therefore, if one party's investment is far more important than the other, we basically have a single moral hazard problem and hence an incomplete contract is likely to be better; if both parties are equally important, we have a true double moral hazard problem and hence a complete contract is likely to be better since a complete contract can better control incentives.
When a contract is incomplete, the principal has all the residual rights not contracted away by the contract. When the principal includes an outside option in a contract, although it gives the principal one more instrument in controlling incentives, the principal gives away that residual right.
In summary, when the incentive problem does not exist, as in Proposition 3, the external risk is the dominant factor and thus the incomplete contract is better. When there is no external risk, as in Proposition 4, the incentive problem is the dominant factor and thus the complete contract is better. When both the external risk and incentive problem exist, as in Proposition 6, the principal has to balance the two factors in her choice of the type of contract. It turns out that a risky labor market, an able outside agent and the unequal importance of investments will tip the balance towards an incomplete contract.
A Parametric Solution
We now illustrate the results in Proposition 6, where the detailed derivation is in the proof of Proposition 6 in the Appendix. Denote the means of 0 s and θ respectively as
The second-best problem under an incomplete contract can be written as
, ⎣ ⎦ and the second-best problem under an complete contract can be written as , and C in Figure 2 . Figure 2 . Dominance of the Contracts in the Three Areas We find that (1) In area C, L s and H s are too high so that there is no gain from the outside option, implying that the incomplete contract is inferior to the complete contract.
(2) In area B, both L s and H s are low so that the outside option will always be used by both contracts, implying that the two contracts are equally efficient. (3) In area A, when H s is large enough, the incomplete contract is better, otherwise the complete contract is better.
We now find a condition on H s in area A by which the incomplete contract is strictly superior. The solutions to the two problems in area A are ( ) 2  2  2  0  1  2  1  2  0  2  2  1  2  1  2   2  1  2  2  0  1  2  1  2  2  2  1  2 
We find that i c * * Π > Π if and only if
The existence of such an H s in area A satisfying condition (14) is guaranteed by the following condition:
Then, condition (14) defines a region within area A in which the incomplete contract is strictly superior. Notice that condition (15) has nothing to do with L s and H s .
We make six observations. First, when s p is close to 1, condition (15) holds. This makes sense; when the labor market is likely to be good for the principal (a low market wage rate), the incomplete contract is better.
Second, since the left-hand side of (15) is decreasing in p θ , the incomplete contract is likely to be better when p θ is large. The explanation for this is that when the inside agent is likely to have low ability, the incomplete contract is superior. Third, since the left-hand side of (15) is decreasing in 0 θ , the incomplete contract is more likely to be superior when 0 θ increases. The explanation is symmetric to the second observation: when 0 θ is large relative to θ, an able substitute is available in the labor market and thus the incomplete contract is superior. Fourth, we find that the right-hand side of (15) Since the joint effort is 1 2 ( , ) , h a b a b μ μ = + expressions in (17) mean that the two parties' investments are equally important in equilibrium. In other words, when (16) is satisfied, we have a substantial double moral hazard and hence the incentive problem is severe; consequently, a complete contract is likely to be better.
Fifth, from the solutions in (11) and (12) the incentive problem is severe, the complete contract is better. Finally, we find ( ) i c E θ θ < , indicating a weaker condition for contract renewal under the incomplete contract. Thus, under an incomplete contract, the inside agent is more likely to get a contract renewal. This makes sense since an incomplete contract needs to improve its attractiveness by offering a lower ability threshold for contract renewal.
conditional job guarantee. The option is contractable ex ante, exercisable ex post, and good for incentives. But, the employer may choose not to mention the option in a contract. Our main findings are that (1) external risks determine contractual incompleteness, and (2) a complete contract can better handle incentives, while an incomplete contract can better handle external risks. In addition, we also find that the unequal importance of investments and the competence of agents are important factors in the choice of the type of contract. In our model, the principal must balance the incentives and the external risk in the choice of the type of contract: an incomplete contract has a negative effect on incentives, but it gives the principal the freedom to ensure ex post efficiency; a complete contract is good for incentives, but it ties the principal's hands ex post. Segal (1999) shows that, within the class of renegotiable contracts, when the trading environment becomes more and more complex, an incomplete contract (in fact, no contract) becomes optimal in the limit. Our conclusion in Proposition 6(a) is somewhat consistent with his. Complexity of environment is a kind of uncertainty; in fact, as the environment becomes more complex, the distribution of randomness becomes flatter (i.e., more uncertainty) as more choices become available. However, in Segal (1999) , an incomplete contract is never optimal; but in our model, when the uncertainty is large enough, an incomplete contract becomes optimal.
Two extensions have been considered. First, we considered a more general renegotiation-proof complete contract, in which the agent has a certain degree of bargaining power ex post if her ability is above the minimum requirement c θ .
Four possible situations were considered. It turns out that Proposition 2 still holds and c i θ θ = . In particular, the explanations in Remark 4 are still valid. This result is related to Wang (2004) , who shows that, under certain conditions, the distribution of control rights and the distribution of bargaining powers are irrelevant.
Second, an introduction of risk aversion into our current model will introduce a third issue into our model: the internal risk. This will dramatically increase the complexity of the problem at hand. On the one hand, the aversion against the risk of a bad labor market will cause the principal to favor an incomplete contract; on the other hand, the aversion against the risk of losing the job will cause the agent to favor a complete contract. As in the current model, a superior contract has to balance the incentives and the risks. It would be interesting to see how the three issues play out in our model. Intuitively, both complete contracts and incomplete contracts can handle internal risks. A complete contract will focus on a risk-sharing arrangement between the inside agent and the principal. An incomplete contract will still play its traditional role in accommodating exter-
Concluding Remarks
In this paper, we consider a typical employment contract with an option for a
Appendix
This appendix contains all the proofs and derivations.
Proof of Lemma 1
Since the IR condition must be binding, the first-best problem becomes
. . , , = + .
( 1 8 ) This problem can be solved in two steps. We first find the optimal efforts ( )
by maximizing the objective function without the constraint. We have
, , , = , we have
is the partial derivation on a assuming a fixed i θ . Thus,
Symmetrically, this expression also holds for variable b. Hence, the first-order conditions for maximizing the objective function are the two equations in (4). Given the efforts from (4), we consider a fixed contract 1 ( ) s x β = , a simple contract, that satisfies the constraint in (18). By the constraint, we find ( ). That is, there is indeed a fixed contract that satisfies the constraint.
Proof of Proposition 1
By equation (1) , , we find nal risks. But, the effectiveness of a complete contract may be weakened when it has to deal with both internal risks and incentives. 
For an arbitrary random variable θ, we find
where E is the expectation operator on θ and 0 s . Then, by (20), we have
Similarly, we have
Therefore, the following two equations imply each other:
Symmetrically, this expression also holds for variable b. Further, we have
Thus, by (23), (24) and (25),
Therefore, a IC and b IC in the principal's second-best problem (3) imply This problem can be solved in two steps. We first find the optimal efforts ( )
And then we find a contract 1 ( ) s x that satisfies the following two conditions: 
Therefore, a IC and b IC in (7) imply Also, since the IR condition must be binding, problem (7) becomes In contrast, the pair of efforts ( )
for the first-best incomplete contract is the solution of the following problem:
For an arbitrary random variable θ, let
where E is the expectation operator on
implying i c * * * * Π ≥ Π .
We now prove that 
Proof of Proposition 4
Given any solution ( ) (8) and (34) 
Given the functions in (9), we have
where E is the expectation operator on 0 s and 
for any 0, λ ≥ as in Figure 3 . Thus,
We also have
If (area A in Figure 2 ) In this case, the incomplete contract is obviously inferior to the complete contract. Let us now investigate area A, which is defined by conditions (37) and (40). With the two revenue functions defined in (38) and (41), problems (8) and (5) 
(1 ) (1 ) 2(1 ) Finally, by Lemmas 1 and 2, we can easily find the first-best solutions: 
